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This paper investigates the conditions under which interest-rate rules induce real
equilibrium indeterminacy in a two-country, sticky-price, monetary model. Using a
discrete-time framework, we employ the two most commonly used timing assumptions
on which money balances enter into the utility function. This paper shows that the tim-
ing equivalence result derived for a closed-economy no longer holds for open economies.
This arises because modiﬁcations in the trading environment impact on the behavior
of the real exchange rate. Consequently this helps explain the seemingly contradictory
ﬁndings in the literature on real indeterminacy in open economies. Furthermore it
challenges the belief that domestic inﬂation targeting is superior to consumer price
inﬂation targeting, in minimizing aggregate instability.
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11 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the real indeterminacy implications of designing
interest rate rules in a world comprised of two symmetric countries characterized by complete
asset markets and nominal price rigidities.1 Using diﬀerent targets of inﬂation, it is shown
that the conditions needed to guarantee real equilibrium determinacy depend not only on the
monetary policy stance of the monetary authority (i.e active vs passive) but can also depend
on the degree of trade openness and the relative size of the elasticity of substitution between
cross-country tradeable goods and the intertemporal substitution elasticity of consumption.
However, the interaction of the above conditions for real determinacy crucially depend on
the timing assumption speciﬁed on how money enters the utility function. In stark contrast
to the closed-economy literature, there is no equivalence between the policy-rule targeted
and the way money is modeled, because alternative timing assumptions on money have
diﬀering behavioral implications for the real exchange rate.
A standard result that emerges from the monetary literature is that in order to rule out
aggregate instability2 the monetary authority should follow an active policy stance, that is,
a policy that aggressively targets either expected inﬂation (e.g. Bernanke and Woodford
(1997), Clarida et al. (2000)) or current inﬂation (e.g. Kerr and King (1996)) by rais-
ing the nominal interest rate by proportionally more than the increase in inﬂation. These
results are obtained using a money-in-the-utility function (MIUF), labor-only, closed econ-
omy model where prices are sticky and preferences are separable with a zero-cross partial
between consumption and real money balances. In addition, Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001,
2005) show that the design of the interest-rate rule crucially depends on the timing assump-
tion speciﬁed when using the popular MIUF approach. While the monetary authority can
aggressively target expected inﬂation under the traditional “cash-when-I’m-done” (CWID)
timing convention, the adoption of such a policy under “cash-in-advance” (CIA) timing,
1Our focus is on real indeterminacy instead of price-level (or nominal) indeterminacy. By real indeterminacy
we simply mean that there exists a continuum of equilibrium paths, starting from the same initial conditions,
which converge to the steady state. Price-level indeterminacy on the other-hand, is where for any equilibrium
sequence there exists an inﬁnite number of initial price levels consistent with a perfect-foresight equilibrium.
As discussed by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000) price-level indeterminacy is of no consequence in and of itself,
but is only important if it leads to real indeterminacy.
2Throughout we use the terms aggregate instability, multiple equilibria and (real) indeterminacy interchange-
ably. Our focus of attention rests solely with the consideration of local stability (i.e local determinacy) as
opposed to global stability (i.e. global determinacy)
2typically results in multiple equilibria.3 This arises because the essential diﬀerence between
CWID and CIA timing assumptions is that the nominal interest rate in the latter is scrolled
forward one period. Consequently Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) ﬁnd the following timing
equivalence result: a current-looking (backward-looking) rule with CIA-timing has the same
determinacy properties as a forward-looking (current-looking) rule with CWID-timing. Our
aim is to investigate these timing diﬀerences in an international setting and re-evaluate this
equivalence result.
In this paper we develop a two-country MIUF model in the spirit of Benigno (2001),
Bergin et al. (2006) and Kollman (2003). Financial markets are assumed to be complete in
the sense that agents in both countries have access to a complete set of contingent claims.
Price stickiness is introduced following Calvo (1983). The Aoki (1981) decomposition ap-
proach is employed to analyze the determinacy properties of the model. The conditions
for real equilibrium determinacy are analyzed for forward, current and backward-looking
versions of the interest rate rule. In addition, two alternative price indexes, which can
be chosen as the policy indicator, are considered: domestic price inﬂation and consumer
price inﬂation. The main results from the analysis can be summarized as follows. With
CWID-timing, the adoption of a current-looking rule introduces no additional restrictions
for achieving equilibrium determinacy in open economies. However, under a forward-looking
rule, the potential range of indeterminacy is greater under consumer price inﬂation target-
ing when compared with domestic inﬂation targeting, which is exacerbated in the former
as the degree of trade openness increases. With CIA-timing, indeterminacy can only occur
under an active current-looking rule if domestic inﬂation is targeted. However, under a
backward-looking rule the range of determinacy generally becomes smaller as the degree of
trade openness increases, for both targets of inﬂation.
Therefore, regardless of the price index targeted, the timing equivalence result ob-
tained from the closed-economy literature does not hold for open economies. Under a
forward-looking rule with CWID-timing, the range of indeterminacy is always greater when
compared to a current-looking rule with CIA-timing.4. However under a current-looking
3As discussed by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) the traditional MIUF approach assumes that end-of-period
money balances enter the utility functional, whereas under cash-in-advance timing the money one has left
over after engaging in asset transactions but before entering the goods market enters the functional.
4This is only true for domestic inﬂation targeting provided that the size of the elasticity of substitution be-
tween cross-country tradeable goods is greater than the intertemporal substitution elasticity of consumption
3rule with CWID-timing the range of determinacy is always greater when compared to a
backward-looking rule with CIA-timing. The explanation behind this breakdown of the
timing equivalence result for open economies arises from the fact that alternative assump-
tions on how money balances enter the utility function impact on risk-sharing between
households in the two countries. The risk-sharing condition under CWID-timing equates
the real exchange rate with the marginal utilities of consumption. However, under CIA-
timing, the marginal utilities of money additionally feature in this risk-sharing condition.
For instance, suppose the central banks targets consumer price inﬂation. Under an active
forward-looking rule with CWID-timing, an inﬂationary belief leads to an increase in the
real interest rate. This not only lowers marginal cost, putting downward pressure on in-
ﬂation, but also leads to an improvement in the terms of trade, putting upward pressure
on inﬂation. If the latter eﬀect is strong enough, which is determined by the degree of
trade openness, then the initial inﬂationary belief can be validated. However under an
active current-looking rule with CIA-timing (the closed-economy equivalent) the liquidity
eﬀect of an increase in the nominal interest rate dampens the terms of trade eﬀect, thereby
preventing the validation of the initial inﬂationary belief.
The breakdown of this timing equivalence helps explain the contradictory results cur-
rently found in the literature on policy induced dynamic (in)stability in open economies.
Developing a small open economy version of the Cooley and Hansen (1989) model, De Fiore
and Liu (2005) ﬁnd that the range of determinacy increases the higher the degree of trade
openness under a forward-looking rule. This is in contrast to the ﬁndings of Linnemann
and Schabert (2002) and Zanna (2003), which employ a cashless, continuous time approach
and conclude that that relatively open economies are more prone to aggregate instability
than relatively closed economies. Linnemann and Schabert (2006), using a cashless, dis-
crete time approach, show that the range of determinacy decreases the higher the degree of
trade openness under a forward-looking rule. As this paper shows, these diﬀerent ﬁndings
regarding the impact of trade openness for equilibrium determinacy can easily be explained
by alternative timing assumptions regarding money.5 Furthermore, this paper also suggests
that caution is required when making conclusions when only one timing assumption is con-
5De Fiore and Liu (2005) employ a strict cash-in-advance constraint to introduce money into the economy.
Linnemann and Schabert (2002, 2006) and Zanna (2003) assume a cashless economy, which is isomorphic
to the traditional MIUF approach under CWID-timing, provided the utility function is separable between
consumption and real money balances.
4sidered. For example, Linnemann and Schabert (2002, 2006), Zanna (2003) and Batini et
al. (2004) conclude that domestic inﬂation targeting is superior to consumer inﬂation tar-
geting, as it reduces the potential range of aggregate instability.6 Our analysis suggests that
this conclusion is a by-product of adopting CWID-timing and is not robust if alternative
timing assumptions on money are employed.
Overall our analysis suggests that the timing assumption speciﬁed on money balances
crucially aﬀects the relationship between the degree of trade openness and the range of
aggregate instability under both consumer and domestic inﬂation targeting. The basic as-
sumptions of monetary models can thus have serious implications for interest-rate rules in
both closed and open economy environments, by aﬀecting the conditions for equilibrium
determinacy. However, the timing convention aﬀects the closed economy and open econ-
omy in diﬀerent ways. In the former, the assumption imposed results in diﬀerent pricing
equations for the nominal interest rate, whereas in the latter, the assumption imposed also
aﬀects the behavior of the real exchange rate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the two-country
model. Section 3 discusses the conditions for real equilibrium determinacy for diﬀerent
interest-rate rule speciﬁcations under CWID-timing. Section 4 considers the impact on the
determinacy conditions when CIA-timing is adopted. Finally Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a global economy that consists of two-countries denoted home and foreign, where
an asterisk denotes foreign variables. Within each country there exists a representative
inﬁnitely-lived agent, a representative ﬁnal good producer, a continuum of intermediate
good producing ﬁrms, and a monetary authority. The representative agent owns all domes-
tic intermediate good producing ﬁrms and supplies labor to the production process. Inter-
mediate ﬁrms operate under monopolistic competition and use domestic labor as inputs to
produce tradeable goods which are sold to the home and foreign ﬁnal good producers. The
labor market is assumed to be competitive. Each representative ﬁnal good producer is a
6Indeed, Linnemann and Schabert (2006) conclude that the particular price index chosen as the policy
indicator is irrelevant as long as the policy is not forward-looking. Our analysis suggests that this conclusion
needs to be qualiﬁed for a monetary economy, since the timing assumption speciﬁed on how money enters
the utility function can generate diﬀerent results.
5competitive ﬁrm that bundles domestic and imported intermediate goods into non-tradeable
ﬁnal goods which are consumed by the domestic agent. Preferences and technologies are
symmetric across the two countries. The following presents the features of the model for
the home country on the understanding that the foreign case can be analogously derived.
2.1 Final Good Producers
The home ﬁnal good (Z) is produced by a competitive ﬁrm that uses ZH and ZF as inputs

















where the relative share of domestic and imported intermediate inputs used in the produc-
tion process is 0 < a < 1 and the constant elasticity of substitution between aggregate home
and foreign intermediate goods is θ > 0. The inputs ZH and ZF are deﬁned as the quantity
indices of domestic and imported intermediate goods respectively:
ZH,t =
















where the elasticity of substitution across domestic (foreign) intermediate goods is λ > 1,
and zH(i) and zf(j) are the respective quantities of the domestic and imported type i and
j intermediate goods. Let pH(i) and pF(j) represent the respective prices of these goods in
home currency. Cost minimization in ﬁnal good production yields the aggregate demand




































where P is the consumer price index and PH and PF are the respective price indices of
home and foreign intermediate goods, all denominated in the home currency:
PH,t =












We assume that there are no costs to trade between the two countries and the law of one
price holds, which implies that






where e denotes the nominal exchange rate. Letting Q = eP
∗
P denote the real exchange




























and hence the purchasing power parity condition is satisﬁed only in the absence of any bias
between home and foreign intermediate goods (i.e. a = 0.5). The relative price T, the





2.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
Intermediate ﬁrms hire labor to produce output given a (real) wage rate wt. A ﬁrm of type
i has a linear production technology
yt(i) = Lt(i). (7)





7where mct ≡ MCt
PH,t is real marginal cost.
Firms set prices according to Calvo (1983), where in each period there is a constant
probability 1 − ϕ that a ﬁrm will be randomly selected to adjust its price, which is drawn
independently of past history. A domestic ﬁrm i, faced with changing its price at time t,
has to choose pH,t(i) to maximize its discounted value of proﬁts, taking as given the indexes

























and the ﬁrm’s discount factor is βsXt,t+s = (Ct+s/Ct)σ(Pt/Pt+s).8 Firms that are given the
opportunity to change their price, at a particular time, all behave in an identical manner.
The ﬁrst-order condition to the ﬁrm’s maximization problem yields







The optimal price set by a domestic home ﬁrm   PH,t is a mark-up λ
λ−1 over a weighted
















Since all prices have the same probability of being changed, with a large number of ﬁrms,





H,t−1 + (1 − ϕ)   P
1−λ
H,t (11)
since the law of large numbers implies that 1−ϕ is also the proportion of ﬁrms that adjust
their price each period.
7While the demand for a ﬁrm’s good is aﬀected by its pricing decision pH,t(i), each producer is small with
respect to the overall market.
8Under the assumption that all ﬁrms are owned by the representative agent, this implies that the ﬁrm’s
discount factor is equivalent to the individual’s intertemporal marginal rate of substitution.
82.3 Representative Agent
The representative agent chooses consumption C, domestic real money balances A/P, and












where the discount factor is 0 < β < 1, subject to the period budget constraint
EtΓt,t+1Bt+1 + Mt + PtCt ≤ Bt + Mt−1 + PtwtLt +
  1
0
Πtd(h) − Υt. (13)
The agent carries Mt−1 units of money, and Bt nominal bonds into period t. Before pro-
ceeding to the goods market, the agent visits the ﬁnancial market where a state contingent
nominal bond Bt+1 can be purchased that pays one unit of domestic currency in period
t + 1 when a speciﬁc state is realized at a period t price Γt,t+1. During period t the agent
supplies labor to the intermediate good producing ﬁrms, receiving real income from wages
wt, nominal proﬁts from the ownership of domestic intermediate ﬁrms Πt and a lump-sum
nominal transfer Υt from the monetary authority. The agent then uses these resources to
purchase the ﬁnal good.
Following Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001), we will consider two alternative measures of
money which may appear in the utility function: the traditional cash-when-i’m-done (CWID)-
timing and the alternative cash-in-advance (CIA)-timing. Under CWID-timing, end of
period money balances enter into the utility function:
At = Mt. (14)
Here the stock of money that yields utility to the representative agent is the amount of
money he leaves the goods market with. However, under CIA-timing, the stock of money
that yields utility is the value of money holdings after bonds have been purchased in the
ﬁnancial markets, but before income has been received or ﬁnal goods have been purchased:
At = Mt−1 − Υt + Bt − EtΓt,t+1Bt+1. (15)
9The period utility function is assumed to be separable among the three arguments
U(C,A/P,L) = U(C) + V (A/P) − H(L).




















= Rt − 1 (19)
where Rt denotes the gross nominal yield on a one-period discount bond deﬁned as R
−1
t ≡
Et{Γt,t+1}. Equation (16) is the consumption Euler equation for the holdings of domestic
bonds where i = 0 represents CWID-timing and i = 1 corresponds to CIA-timing, with
the respective money demand equation given by equations (18) and (19). Thus, the ﬁrst
key diﬀerence between the two timing assumptions is that under CIA-timing the nominal
interest rate is scrolled forward one period. Changes in real holdings of money directly
inﬂuence the the real interest rate under CIA-timing, whereas they only have an indirect
eﬀect on the real interest rate under CWID-timing. The labor supply decision is determined
by equation (17). Optimizing behavior implies that the budget constraint (13) holds with
equality in each period and the appropriate transversality condition is satisﬁed. Analogous
conditions apply to the foreign agent.
From the ﬁrst-order conditions for the home and foreign agent, the following risk-sharing


































. Equation (20) is the
standard uncovered interest rate parity condition, whereas equations (21) and (22) follow
from the assumption of complete asset markets, under CWID and CIA-timing respectively.
Hence, the second key diﬀerence between the timing assumptions relates to the risk sharing
condition which equates the real exchange rate Q with the marginal utilities of consumption.
Under CIA-timing, the marginal utilities of money are also included in (22), reﬂecting the
fact that under CIA-timing a bond sale for consumption purposes, increases the utility from
current consumption and current liquidity.
2.4 Monetary Authority
The monetary authority can adjust the nominal interest rate in response to changes in
domestic price inﬂation πh




















where R > 1 and the timing-index v represents the inﬂation-targeting behavior of the
monetary authority. If v = 0, the monetary authority targets current inﬂation. If v = −1
the policy rule is backward-looking, whereas v = 1 corresponds to forward-looking inﬂation
targeting. The parameter µ determines whether monetary policy is active or passive. An
active monetary policy corresponds to µ > 1, where the real interest rate rises in response
to higher inﬂation, as the monetary authority increases the nominal interest rate by more
than the increase in inﬂation. A passive monetary policy on the other hand corresponds to
0 ≤ µ < 1, where the real interest rate falls in response to higher inﬂation.
2.5 Market Clearing and Equilibrium
Market clearing for the home goods market requires
ZH,t + Z∗
H,t = Yt. (25)
11Total home demand must equal the supply of the ﬁnal good,
Zt = Ct, (26)
and the labor, money and bond markets all clear:
Υt = Mt − Mt−1 Bt + B∗
t = 0. (27)
Deﬁnition 1 (Rational Expectations Equilibrium): Given an initial allocation of Bt0,
B∗
t0, and Mt0−1, M∗
t0−1, a rational expectations equilibrium is a set of sequences {Ct, C∗
t ,
Mt, M∗
t , Lt, L∗
t, Bt, Bt, Rt, R∗
t, MCt, MC∗
t , wt, w∗
t, Yt, Y ∗
t , et, Qt, Pt, P ∗
t , PH,t,   PH,t,
  P ∗
F,t, P ∗
H,t, PF,t, P ∗
F,t, Zt, Z∗
t , ZH,t, ZF,t, Z∗
H,t, Z∗
F,t} for all t ≥ t0 characterized by:
(i) the optimality conditions of the representative agent, (16) to (17) and the appropriate
money demand equation (18) or (19);
(ii) the intermediate ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-order condition (8), price-setting rules, (10) and (11), and
the aggregate version of the production function (7);
(iii) the ﬁnal good producer’s optimality conditions, (2), and (4);
(iv) all markets clear, (25) to (27);
(v) the representative agent’s budget constraint (13) is satisﬁed and the transversality con-
ditions hold;
(vi) the monetary policy rule is satisﬁed, (23) or (24);
along with the foreign counterparts for (i)-(vii) and the conditions, (5), (6), (20) and either
(21) if CWID-timing is adopted or (22) if CIA-timing is adopted.
2.6 Local Equilibrium Dynamics
In order to analyze the equilibrium dynamics of the model, a ﬁrst-order Taylor approxi-
mation is taken around a steady state to replace the non-linear equilibrium system with
an approximation which is linear. In what follows, a variable   Xt denotes the percentage
deviation of Xt with respect to its steady state value X (i.e.   Xt = Xt−X
X ). To be precise
12the model is linearized around a symmetric steady state in which prices in the two countries






F). Then by deﬁnition inﬂation is
zero (π = π∗ = 1), and the steady state terms of trade and nominal and real exchange rate
are T = e = Q = 1. For convenience, the complete linearized system of equations is summa-
rized in Table 1 where the parameters are: σ > 0 measures the intertemporal substitution
elasticity of consumption; φ > 0 measures the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity;
θ > 0 measures the elasticity of substitution between aggregate home and foreign goods;
Λ1 ≡
(1−ψ)(1−βψ)
ψ > 0 is the degree of monopolistic competition in the intermediate ﬁrm
sector where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor and 0 < ψ < 1 is the degree of price stickiness;
and a ∈ {(0,0.5) ∪ (0.5,1)} is the degree of trade openness measured by the relative share
of intermediate imports used in ﬁnal good production (1 − a).
Since the two countries are symmetric, we employ the sum and diﬀerence approach in
order to analyze the determinacy properties of the model.9 Thus, we solve both for cross-





2 . Then, given
solutions for XR and XW, one can recover solutions for   X and   X∗ from:




  X∗ = XW −
XR
2
The Aoki decomposition decomposes the the two-country model into two decoupled dynamic
systems: the aggregate system that captures the properties of the closed world economy
and the diﬀerence system that portrays the open-economy dimension. Consequently for
the equilibrium to be determinate it must be the case that there is a unique solution both
for cross-country diﬀerences and world aggregates. Therefore, from a policy perspective,
interest rate setting in both countries must ensure determinacy of both relative variables
and the aggregate world economy.10
9This is the standard approach to solving two-country models since Aoki (1981).
10In terms of the Aoki decomposition of the model, the choice of which measure of inﬂation each monetary
authority targets is irrelevant in terms of the determinacy conditions for the aggregate system. This follows








Therefore the determinacy conditions can be aﬀected by each monetary authorities choice of responding to
consumer or domestic price inﬂation, through inﬂuencing the eigenvalues only of the diﬀerence system.







=   ZR












t = Λ12(1 − a)[1 + φ2θa]  Tt + Λ1
 
φ(2a − 1) + 1
σ

























t = (2a − 1)  π
R(h−f
∗)
t + 2(1 − a)∆  et Inﬂation
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2 and ∆  et ≡   et −   et−1.
The set of linear equations summarized in Table 1 can be reduced to a system of linear








where A and Z are coeﬃcient matrices and x is the column vector containing the en-
dogenous variables. Provided A is non-singular, then the dynamic behavior of the system
is governed by the eigenvalues of the reduced form coeﬃcient matrix A−1Z. For linear
rational expectation models, Blanchard and Kahn (1980) provide the local conditions for
existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. A general condition for determinacy is that the
number of eigenvalues of the matrix A−1Z outside the unit circle (i.e. eigenvalues of mod-
ulus greater than 1) has to be equal to the number of non-predetermined variables for a
unique solution. If however the number of eigenvalues outside the unit circle is less than
the number of non-predetermined variables the equilibrium is locally indeterminate.
143 Equilibrium Determinacy
This section examines the conditions for equilibrium determinacy under CWID-timing when
monetary policy is characterized by either a forward or current-looking rule and both do-
mestic and consumer price inﬂation are possible inﬂation targets.
3.1 Forward-looking rules
The set of linearized equations for the world aggregates, given in Table 1, can be reduced
to the following two-dimensional system:
EtxW
t+1 = AxW
t , xt =
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Since x is a column vector of non-predetermined variables, equilibrium determinacy requires
that both eigenvalues of A are outside the unit circle. Then by Proposition C.1 of Woodford
(2003) the following result is obtained:
Proposition 1 Suppose that monetary policy is characterized by a forward-looking interest
rate rule with CWID-timing. Then a necessary and suﬃcient condition for determinacy of
the aggregate system is




The conditions for determinacy of the aggregate system presented in proposition 1 is anal-
ogous to the conditions obtained under a forward-looking rule for a similar closed-economy,
sticky-price model. This is not surprising since the aggregate system is independent of
the open-economy parameters θ and a. Therefore, while an active monetary policy is a
necessary condition for determinacy, this is not suﬃcient since the inﬂation coeﬃcient µ is
bounded from above. However, for standard parameter values this upper bound is unlikely
to bind. For example setting β = 0.99, ψ = 0.75, and σ = φ = 1 then a µ ≥ 24.185 is
required in order to generate indeterminacy.


































σ, Λ2 = 1+σφ+4φa(1−a)(θ −σ) > 0 and κ1 = 1
if domestic price inﬂation is targeted and κ1 = 1 − 2(1 − a)µ if consumer price inﬂation is
targeted. As before, determinacy requires that both eigenvalues of the coeﬃcient matrix
are outside the unit circle.
Proposition 2 Suppose that monetary policy targets forward-looking domestic price inﬂa-
tion with CWID-timing. Then a necessary and suﬃcient condition for determinacy of the
diﬀerence system is
1 < µ < 1 +
2(1 + β)
Λ1[1 + σφ + 4φa(1 − a)(θ − σ)]
≡ Γ1 (30)
First note that if θ = σ then the determinacy conditions of the diﬀerence system and the
closed-economy are analogous. Consequently for any θ ≤ σ, the open-economy introduces
no additional requirements for determinacy, such that if (29) is satisﬁed, then both the
aggregate and diﬀerence systems are determinate. However, if θ > σ then the upper bound
on the inﬂation coeﬃcient for the diﬀerence system (30) is reduced relative to (29).11 Con-
sequently the potential range of indeterminacy is greater in the open-economy and gets
increasingly worse the larger the diﬀerence between θ and σ. The impact that the degree




8(1 + β)Λ1φ(θ − σ)(2a − 1)
Λ2
1 [1 + σφ + 4φa(1 − a)(θ − σ)]
2 ≷ 0 (31)
where for any θ > σ, (31) > 0 if a > 0.5 and (31) < 0 if a < 0.5. Consequently this implies
that the range of indeterminacy is greater when preferences over trade tend towards the
no-bias case a = 0.5.12 For example, setting β = 0.99, ψ = 0.75, and σ = φ = 1, Figure 1
11The discussion on the likely relative size of θ and σ is postponed until section 4.1.1 below.
12The analysis does not consider the case when a = 0.5 since this would imply that purchasing power parity
(PPP) is satisﬁed and consequently the linearized inﬂation equation   πR
t = (2a −1)  π
R(h−f∗)
t + 2(1 −a)∆  et
















θ = 6 
θ = 3 
Figure 1: Regions of indeterminacy under a forward-looking domestic price inﬂation rule
depicts the regions in the parameter space (a, µ) that are associated with determinacy (D)
and indeterminacy (I) around the neighborhood of the steady state, for θ = 3 and θ = 6.
Recalling that given these parameter values, determinacy of the aggregate system requires
a µ < 24.185 it is apparent that indeterminacy is more likely to occur in the open-economy
and becomes a more serious problem as θ − σ > 0 increases and as a → 0.5.
Proposition 3 Suppose that monetary policy targets forward-looking consumer price in-
ﬂation with CWID-timing. Then for an active monetary policy (µ > 1), a necessary and
suﬃcient condition for determinacy of the diﬀerence system is13








2(1 + β) + Λ1Λ2
Λ1Λ2 + 4(1 + β)(1 − a)
 
(32)
where Λ2 = 1 + σφ + 4φa(1 − a)(θ − σ) > 0.
Under CPI inﬂation targeting, the inﬂation coeﬃcient µ is constrained by two upper bounds,
both of which are increasing with respect to a:
reduces to the relative PPP condition for consumer price inﬂation i.e.   πR
t = ∆  et.
13While determinacy of the diﬀerence system can also be achieved under a passive monetary policy (µ < 1),
such conditions are not reported since the aggregate system is always indeterminate (from Proposition 1).






















4(1 + β)[Λ1 [1 + 2φθ − φσ − 4φ(θ − σ)a(1 − a)] + 2(1 + β)]
[Λ1Λ2 + 4(1 + β)(1 − a)]
2 > 0.
Thus the range of indeterminacy is potentially greater the higher the degree of trade open-
ness (i.e. the lower is a). This is most evidently apparent from the upper bound ΓA
2
where only an a > 0.5 can be consistent with µ > 1 regardless of the values of θ and
σ.14 Figure 2 depicts the regions in the parameter space (a, µ) that are associated with
determinacy (D) and indeterminacy (I) given the parameter values β = 0.99, ψ = 0.75, and
σ = φ = θ = 1. Under a forward-looking CPI rule, each monetary authority setting, for
example, a µ < 24.185 can no longer guarantee a unique equilibrium path and the range of
indeterminacy increases substantially as the degree of trade openness increases.
14While the values of θ and σ do inﬂuence the upper bound ΓB
2 , the sensitivity analysis suggests that the
impact on the threshold levels for determinacy is small.
183.2 Current-looking Rules
The aggregate system under a current-looking rule is given by:
EtxW
t+1 = CxW
t , xt = [  ZW























































where λ1 and Λ2 are deﬁned as above. As before, determinacy requires that both eigenvalues
of the coeﬃcient matrices C and D are outside the unit circle.
Proposition 4 Suppose that monetary policy is characterized by a current-looking interest
rate rule with CWID-timing. Then a necessary and suﬃcient condition for determinacy of
the aggregate system and the diﬀerence system under domestic inﬂation targeting is µ > 1.
Proposition 4 shows that implementing a current-looking rule has no impact on the require-
ments for equilibrium determinacy in the open-economy if each monetary authority targets
domestic price inﬂation. Therefore for any value of θ and σ a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for determinacy is for the central bank to follow an active monetary policy.









t ,  π
R













β [1 + 4(1 − a)aφθ + φσ(2a − 1)2] σ
 



















Thus determinacy requires that one eigenvalue of the coeﬃcient matrix is inside the unit
circle and the other two are outside the unit circle, since the lagged value of the inﬂation rate
19is predetermined. Then by proposition C.2 of Woodford (2003) the next result is obtained.
Proposition 5 Suppose that monetary policy targets current-looking consumer price inﬂa-
tion with CWID-timing. Then a necessary and suﬃcient condition for determinacy of the
diﬀerence system is µ > 1 and either









1 − β(2 − β)
2(1 − β)
(34)
where Λ2 = 1 + σφ + 4φa(1 − a)(θ − σ) > 0.
Proposition 5 shows that determinacy can also be easily achieved under an active monetary
policy provided either (33) or (34) is satisﬁed. Using standard parameter values for β, ψ
and φ to calculate the eigenvalues numerically, the sensitivity analysis suggests then one of
these conditions is always satisﬁed for any value of σ, θ and µ > 1. Therefore the analysis
suggests that regardless of the inﬂation index targeted, indeterminacy is virtually impossible
under a current-looking rule.
Consequently given the assumption of CWID-timing the following conclusions emerge.
Under forward-looking rules, cross-country trade can make an economy vulnerable to ag-
gregate instability. If consumer price inﬂation is targeted, the higher the degree of trade
openness, the greater the possibility of inducing sunspot equilibria. If domestic price inﬂa-
tion is targeted, then provided θ > σ, aggregate instability increases as a → 0.5. Secondly,
in order to minimize aggregate instability, targeting domestic inﬂation is always preferable
to targeting consumer price inﬂation. This result complements Clarida et al. (2002) conclu-
sion that not only is domestic inﬂation targeting the optimal monetary policy to implement
in a two-country economy, but it is also the most eﬀective index of inﬂation to reduce real
indeterminacy.
204 CWID vs CIA-timing
How robust are the above results to the timing assumption on how money enters the utility
function? It is straightforward to show that the aggregate system with CIA-timing un-
der a current (backward)-looking rule can be reduced to the same two dimensional system
obtained with CWID-timing under a forward (current)-looking rule. Consequently for the
aggregate system the timing-equivalence result of Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) is replicated:
the determinacy conditions for a current (backward)-looking rule with CIA-timing is analo-
gous to the conditions for a forward (current)-looking rule with CWID-timing. This section
shows the breakdown of this timing-equivalence result for the diﬀerence system, under both
domestic and consumer price inﬂation targeting.
4.1 Current-looking rules
4.1.1 Domestic Price Inﬂation
We start by considering the determinacy properties of the diﬀerence system for current-
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σ(2a−1) + φ(2a − 1) + 1
σ, λ2 =
2(1−a)[1+2aφθ]
2a−1 and the requirement for
determinacy is that both eigenvalues are outside the unit circle.
Proposition 6 Suppose that monetary policy targets current-looking domestic price inﬂa-
tion with CIA-timing. Then the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for determinacy of the
diﬀerence system is µ > 1 and:
either (i) 2θa > σ(2a − 1) or (ii) µ <
1 − β
Λ12(1 − a)φ[2a(σ − θ) − σ]
≡ ΓA
3 (35)













Figure 3: Regions of indeterminacy under a current-looking domestic price inﬂation rule
with CIA-timing (σ = 5 and θ = 1.5)
and
either (i) Λ3 > 1 or (ii) µ <
2(1 + β) + Λ1Λ2
Λ1 [1 − Λ3]
≡ ΓB
3 (36)
where Λ2 = 1 + σφ + 4φa(1 − a)(θ − σ) > 0 and Λ3 = φ[4a(1 − a)(θ − σ) + σ(3 − 4a)].
First consider the upper bounds given by (35)(ii) and (36)(ii). Comparing these upper
bounds with Γ0 of condition (29) for the aggregate system, it is straightforward to verify
that ΓB
3 > Γ0 > ΓA
3 . Thus if condition (35)(i) is satisﬁed the diﬀerence system places
no additional restrictions on equilibrium determinacy. Hence, if the aggregate system is
determinate then the diﬀerence system is also determinate. Now consider the case when






2(1 − β)Λ1φ[4a(σ − θ) − σ]
[Λ12(1 − a)φ[2a(σ − θ) − σ]]
2 < 0
which implies that the upper bound ΓA
3 decreases, the lower the degree of trade openness.
Figure 3 depicts the regions in the parameter space (a, µ) that are associated with deter-
minacy (D) and indeterminacy (I) given the parameter values β = 0.99, ψ = 0.75, φ = 1,
σ = 5 and θ = 1.5. Note that the aggregate system is determinate for these parameter
values provided µ < 8.7282. Figure 3 suggests that for these parameter values, the upper
bound on µ to sustain determinacy is remarkably small. For a low degree of trade openness
22indeterminacy exists until a becomes suﬃciently low for condition (35)(i) to bind. Thus
this is an example where relatively closed economies can be more prone to indeterminacy
than relatively open economies.
Therefore the timing of money matters in the open economy. If the monetary authority
targets domestic inﬂation under a forward-looking rule with CWID-timing, proposition 2
suggests that the diﬀerence system could induce additional determinacy restrictions when
θ > σ, whereby indeterminacy gets progressively worse as a → 0.5. Under CIA-timing and
a current-looking rule, the diﬀerence system places additional restrictions on determinacy
when θ < σ and a > 0.5.15
4.1.2 Consumer Price Inﬂation
If consumer price inﬂation is targeted then the diﬀerence system is given by:
EtxR
t+1 = GxR
t , xt =
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where λ1, λ2 and Λ2 are deﬁned as above. Determinacy requires that one eigenvalue is
inside the unit circle and the other two eigenvalues are outside the unit circle.
Proposition 7 Suppose that monetary policy targets current-looking consumer price in-
ﬂation with CIA-timing. Then for an active monetary policy (µ > 1) the necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for determinacy of the diﬀerence system is, either:
(i) 4(1 − a)(1 + β) > Λ1Λ4 or (ii) µ <
2(1 + β) + Λ1Λ2
Λ1Λ4 − 4(1 − a)(1 + β)
≡ Γ4 (37)
15Empirical studies oﬀer no clear conclusion on the size of θ and σ. For instance the literature suggests that
σ be between 1 and 10 (e.g. Gali et al. (2002)). For θ, evidence suggests that it can take a value anywhere
between 1 and 7 (e.g. Treﬂer and Lai (1999)). Thus it is empirically plausible for σ ≷ θ.
23and either




µ[2(1 − a)µ(1 − β) + Λ1Λ2(µ − 1) − Λ1µ2(1 − a)[1 + 2aθφ] − 1]
+(1 − β) + 2β(1 − a)µ + Λ1µ2(1 − a)[1 + 2aθφ] > 0
(38)
where Λ2 = 1 + σφ + 4φa(1 − a)(θ − σ), Λ4 = φσ + 4a − 3 − 4φa(1 − a)(θ + σ) and
|A2| ≡ 1 + 1





First consider the upper bound Γ4 on the inﬂation coeﬃcient given by (37)(ii). Comparing
this upper bound with condition (29) for the aggregate system yields Γ4 > Γ0. Hence if con-
dition (38) is satisﬁed the diﬀerence system places no additional restrictions on equilibrium
determinacy. Using standard parameter values for β, ψ and φ to calculate the eigenvalues
numerically, the sensitivity analysis suggests that condition (38) is always satisﬁed for any
value of σ, θ and µ > 1. Furthermore, the numerical exercise highlights that condition
(37)(i) is very likely to bind unless the degree of trade openness is very low. Using values
of β = 0.99, ψ = 0.75 and φ = 1 requires a > 0.98 for (37)(i) not to bind with θ = 3, σ = 1
or a > 0.95 with θ = 1.5 and σ = 5.
Therefore if the monetary authority targets CPI inﬂation with CIA-timing, under a
current-looking rule, the diﬀerence system introduces no additional requirements for equi-
librium determinacy. This is in stark contrast to a forward-looking rule with CWID-timing,
where the range of indeterminacy increases substantially as the degree of trade openness
increases. It is also apparent from propositions 6 and 7, that CPI inﬂation targeting in
this example is superior to domestic inﬂation targeting, in minimizing aggregate instability.
This is in stark contrast to the results obtained with CWID-timing, whereby the domestic
price index was shown to be the preferable.
4.2 Backward-looking Rules
Here we brieﬂy consider the determinacy properties of the diﬀerence system for backward-
looking inﬂation rules with CIA-timing. For domestic inﬂation targeting the diﬀerence
24system is given by:
EtxR
t+1 = HxR
t , xt =
 
  ZR
t ,  π
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where λ1, λ2 and Λ2 are deﬁned as before. Thus determinacy requires that one eigenvalue
is inside the unit circle and the other two are outside the unit circle, since the lagged value
of the domestic inﬂation rate is predetermined.
Proposition 8 Suppose that monetary policy targets backward-looking domestic price in-
ﬂation under CIA-timing. Then for an active monetary policy (µ > 1) the necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for determinacy of the diﬀerence system is, either:
(i) Λ3 < 1 or (ii) µ <
2(1 + β) + Λ1Λ2










[2aθ − σ(2a − 1)][Λ1µ2(1 − a) + 1 + β + Λ1Λ2]
+1 − β + Λ1µ[1 + φσ(2a − 1)] > 0
(40)
where Λ2 = 1 + σφ + 4φa(1 − a)(θ − σ) and Λ3 = φ[4a(1 − a)(θ − σ) + σ(3 − 4a)].
First consider condition (39)(i). This condition binds for any value of θ and σ provided




4φΛ1Λ4(σ − θ)(1 − 2a) + 4φΛ1 [2(1 + β) + Λ1Λ2]
Λ2
1 [Λ3 − 1]
2 ≷ 0 (41)
where Λ4 = 2(1+β)+Λ1 [Λ2 − Λ3 + 1] > 0. Given a < 0.5, if σ > θ then (41) > 0 whereas
if θ > σ then (41) ≷ 0. This is illustrated in Figure 4, which depicts the regions in the
parameter space (a, µ) associated with determinacy (D) or an explosive solution (N), given
the parameter values β = 0.99, ψ = 0.75 and φ = 1. For the case when σ > θ, the upper















θ = 1.5; σ = 5 
θ = 3; σ = 1 
Figure 4: Regions of determinacy under a backward-looking domestic price inﬂation rule
with CIA-timing
















θ = 1.5; σ = 5 
θ = 3; σ = 1 
Figure 5: Regions of determinacy under a backward-looking consumer price inﬂation rule
with CIA-timing
26bound on the inﬂation coeﬃcient required for determinacy increases as the degree of trade
openness decreases. However, when θ < σ, the upper bound ﬁrst decreases for low values of a
and then increases thereafter. Figure 5 depicts the regions of determinacy under a backward-
looking consumer price inﬂation rule, where by inspection, a determinate solution only exists
for a very low degree of trade openness. Comparing these results with propositions 4 and
5, it is apparent that regardless of the index of inﬂation targeted, once again, the timing-
equivalence result fails for open economies.
4.3 Discussion
The results from the above analysis suggest that for open economies there is no equivalence
between the policy-rule targeted and the way money is modeled. Therefore the assumptions
made on how money balances enter the utility function has serious implications for the
conditions for equilibrium determinacy. This follows from that fact that regardless of the
timing assumption imposed on how money enters the utility function, this has no eﬀect on
the timing of interest rates in the no-arbitrage condition between home and foreign bonds,
which is a key equation in solving for cross-country relative variables (20). Consequently
diﬀerent timing conventions result in diﬀerent behavioral implications for the real exchange
rate. Take, for example, the case of CPI inﬂation targeting. Despite the fact that the local
dynamics of the two aggregate systems are identical, indeterminacy is not possible in the
diﬀerence system under a current-looking rule with CIA-timing, while indeterminacy can
arise under a forward-looking rule with CWID-timing. The intuition for this rests with
the degree of inﬂuence the terms of trade exerts on the adjustment dynamics of the CPI
inﬂation rate. By imposing the deﬁnition of the terms of trade into the CPI index (4), it
is straightforward to show that the CPI inﬂation rate (in terms of the percentage deviation
from its steady state value) depends on both the domestic inﬂation rate and the terms of
trade position
  πt+1 =   πh
t+1 + (1 − a)
 
  Tt+1 −   Tt
 
. (42)
Under the assumption of CWID-timing, now suppose that, in response to a non-fundamental
shock, the agent in the home country believes that home CPI inﬂation rate is expected to
rise. Under an active, interest rate policy, the domestic monetary authority responds by
27Table 2: Real Indeterminacy in Open-economies
CWID-timing CIA-timing
FLR CLR CLR BLR
AS D D D D
DS σ > θ σ < θ σ > θ σ < θ σ > θ σ < θ
PPI D D D I: a > 0.72 D N: a < 0.11 D
CPI I: a < 0.95 I: a < 0.92 D D D N: a < 0.86 N: a < 0.9
The results reported above are based on the parameter values outlined in the main text. The notation is
as follows: D, determinacy; I, indeterminacy; N, no perfect-foresight equilibrium exists; and a represents
the degree of trade openness.
increasing the home real interest rate which lowers domestic current consumption, domestic
real marginal cost and thus the domestic inﬂation rate. In the closed economy this negates
the possibility of sunspot equilibria since the domestic and CPI inﬂation rates are the same.
In an open economy, the relative increase in the domestic real interest rate implies a current
nominal appreciation (i.e.   et+1 rises relative to   et) from the interest parity condition (20)
and thus an improvement in the terms of trade (i.e.   Tt+1 increases relative to   Tt). From
(42), this puts upward pressure on the home CPI inﬂation rate.
Since the degree of openness determines the inﬂuence of the terms of trade on the CPI
inﬂation rate, if this eﬀect is strong enough, the CPI inﬂation rate can actually rise despite
domestic inﬂation falling, thus validating the initial inﬂationary belief. However, under CIA-
timing the nominal interest rate is now negatively related to the real exchange rate (22).
This exerts additional downward pressure on real marginal cost and hence domestic inﬂation,
the eﬀect of which is stronger, the higher the degree of trade openness. Consequently this
counterbalances the impact of upward pressure exerted on CPI inﬂation brought about by
an improvement in the terms of trade and thus can prevent the validation of the initial
inﬂationary belief.
Table 2 summarizes the key results of this analysis using the following parameter values:
β = 0.99, ψ = 0.75, φ = 1, µ = 5 and for σ > θ we set σ = 5 and θ = 1.5 and for σ < θ we
set σ = 1 and θ = 3. The results from the above analysis therefore suggest that the inter-
relationship between the degree of trade openness, the index of inﬂation targeted and the
determinacy conditions are aﬀected by the timing assumption on money imposed. Since
28the timing equivalence result fails to hold in open economies there is no straightforward
results for determinacy because the above issues interact. If CWID-timing is assumed then
indeterminacy can be prevented if the monetary authority avoids implementing a forward-
looking rule. Otherwise, indeterminacy is more likely to exist the more open is the economy.
If CIA-timing is assumed, then indeterminacy can be prevented under a current-looking
rule by targeting the consumer price inﬂation. Otherwise, indeterminacy is more likely to
exist, the more closed the economy. With the failure of the timing equivalence result, the
belief that domestic inﬂation targeting is preferable to CPI targeting in reducing multiple
equilibria does not stand up under closer inspection.
5 Conclusion
We have considered the implications of designing interest rate rules in order to prevent
policy induced aggregate instability in a two country open-economy framework. It has been
shown that the timing equivalence result derived for a closed-economy, no longer applies
to open economies. The basic assumptions of monetary models can thus have much wider
implications for (in)determinacy of interest-rate rules, once we allow for international trade
in both goods and assets. In the closed-economy, the timing assumption on money balances
aﬀects the pricing equation for the nominal interest rate. In open economies the timing
assumption also aﬀects the behavior of the real exchange rate, which has serious implications
for the relationship between the degree of trade openness, the index of inﬂation targeted
and the emergence of sunspot equilibria. Consequently monetary authorities face much
greater challenges in designing interest rate rules for open economies without unintentionally
generating aggregate instability.
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